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DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURE
UHF RFID PROTOCOL ON FPGA
SUMMARY
Latest technological improvements led to increase in production of numerous different
products and applications in different stages of daily life. As a these products and
applications became industrial, the number of users has increased and feasibility
of operations became harder. In order to prevent failure of these systems due to
high number of users, identification systems are developed as a solution in order to
determine an optimum quiescent point for operations considering number of users and
efficiency. The use of Radio Frequency Identification System (RFID), which is one
of mentioned identification systems, is scaling up day by day as a result of ease of
applicability and efficiency.
RFID technology is involved in many different systems and applications nowadays.
Since RFID systems give chance for user processes to be completed rapidly, they are
applied for many different purposes such as toll collection systems in highways, card
readers in public transportation vehicles, product bar-codes in shops, patient follow-up
in hospitals, container follow-up in ships and etc.
RFID systems are composed of reader and tag structures. Considering the tag
architectures, RFID systems might be examined in three different categories as passive,
semi-active and active systems [4]. In passive systems, the tag is not supplied. DC
supply is provided by incoming RF signals. Tag powers up and responds when it is in
the range of the reader, but can not start communication with the reader by itself. In
semi active systems, both the reader and the tag are supplied. Communication between
the tag and reader is controlled by reader as in passive systems. The advantages of the
semi active systems over passive systems is higher range. In active systems reader and
tag are supplied and both have ability to start communication between.
While RFID systems increase efficiency of applications, they lead to an important
problem, user security [5].Security gaps that might occur in use of RFID systems
may lead to undesired disclosure of identity ofindividual users, inadvertent access to
databases of companies and organizations that may result in capture of important data
by undesired third-party individuals or companies and financial losses. Accordingly,
security has gained more important in RFID technology and design of secure RFID
systems came into prominence.
Under consideration of above mentioned facts, design and implementation of a secure
UHF RFID system was accomplished in first phase of the thesis, by proposing new
reader and transponder hardware. Active tag architecture was preferred in system
design to keep the communication range long and security level high. 868 MHz
center frequency is selected for system operation considering European UHF band
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RFID regulations defined by European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI).
RFM22B transceiver modules were decided on and used for RF front-end stages of
reader and tag taking into low power consumption and flexible operating features.
FPGA boards formed up microcontroller part of designed reader and tag to keep the
computational power substantially high. A communication protocol with two way
authentication mechanism was used between receiver and transmitter devices. Tiny
Encryption Algorithm was preferred in the design to secure the transmitted data. As a
result, a secure RFID system with 64 byte authentication procedure was implemented.
In second part, attack studies were held on designed system. The aim of the attacks
were to impersonate the original tag with an attack device and convince the reader
that original tag is in range of communication. To accomplish replay attacks, an
attack device similar to the reader and tag architecture, was designed and prepared
for operation. Firstly, reader and tag data was listened by attack device and sent to a
personal computer for storage over serial communication link. Later on, stored data is
replayed back to the reader when the original tag was out of communication range.
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GÜVENLI˙ BI˙R UHF RFID PROTOKOLÜNÜN
FPGA ÜZERI˙NDE TASARIMI VE GERÇEKLENMESI˙
ÖZET
Teknolojinin son yıllardaki hızlı gelis¸imi birçok ürün ve uygulamanın kullanımını
büyük ölçüde arttırmıs¸tır. Kullanıcı sayısındaki artıs¸a bag˘lı olarak da çalıs¸maların
uygulanabilirlig˘i daha zor kontrol edilebilir hale gelmis¸ ve kısıtlanmıs¸tır. Sistemler
için kullanıcı sayısı ve etkinlik arasında optimum bir çalıs¸ma noktası için ise belirli
Kimlik Belirleme Sistemleri gelis¸tirilmis¸tir. Bu sistemlerden biri olan Radyo Frekansı
ile Kimlik Belirleme (RFID) teknolojisinin kullanım alanları da kolay uygulanabilen
ve etkin bir sistem olmasından dolayı gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Söz konusu sistemler
kullanıcı is¸lemlerinin hızlı bir s¸ekilde gerçekles¸tirilmesine olanak sag˘ladıkları için
günümüzde otoyollardaki ücret ödeme noktaları, toplu tas¸ıma araçlarındaki kart
okuyucular, giyim mag˘azalarında ürün barkodları, hastahanelerde hasta takibi,
gemilerde konteyner takibi gibi birçok farklı uygulamada kullanılmaktadır.
RFID sistemlerinin kullanımı uygulamaların etkinlig˘ini arttırırken kullanıcı güvenlig˘i
gibi önemli bir sorunu da beraberinde getirmektedir [2]. RFID sistemlerinin
kullanılması sırasında olus¸abilecek güvenlik açıkları, bireysel kullanıcıların kimlik
bilgilerinin açıg˘a çıkması, kurumsal kullanıcıların veritabanlarına eris¸ilmesi sonucu
önemli bilgilerin istenmeyen kis¸i ve kurumların eline geçmesi, finansal verilerde
yapılabilecek deg˘is¸ikler sonrası maddi kayıplar olus¸ması gibi önemli sonuçlara yol
açabilir [6]. Bu nedenle güveli RFID sistemlerinin tasarımı büyük önem kazanmıs¸tır.
RFID sistemleri, birçok tasarım parametresine sahip olmalarından dolayı deg˘is¸ik
açılardan incelenebilirler. Çalıs¸ma frekansı, haberles¸me mesafesi, güvenlik
gereksinimleri, ve bellek kapasitesi RFID sistem tasarımında en önemli parame-
trelerdir. Çalıs¸ma frekansı seçiminde birtakım kıstaslar söz konusudur. Near
Field Communication (NFC) aygıtları LF ve HF gibi düs¸ük frekans bantlarında
çalıs¸ırken uzak alan bazlı sistemler daha yüksek frekanslarda çalıs¸ır. Bununla birlikte,
frekans standardizasyonu da çalıs¸ma frekansının belirlenmesinde etkilidir. Haberles¸me
mesafesi, güvenlik gereksinimleri ve bellek kapasitesi daha çok uygulamaya özel
parametrelerdir. Eg˘er uygulama sırasındaki okuyucu-etiket mesafesi yüksekse, sistem
tasarımı buna uygun olarak yapılmalıdır. Tam tersi bir durumda da sistem maliyetini
arttıracak donanımın kullanılmasından kaçınılmalıdır. Güvenlik gereksinimleri aynı
zamanda gerek duyulan bellek kapasitesini etkilemektedir. Yüksek güvenlik gerektiren
bir uygulamada daha genis¸ bellek alanına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.
Bir RFID sistemi okuyucu, etiket ve veritabanından olus¸ur. Etiketler pasif, yarı-aktif
ya da aktif olarak 3 farklı gruba ayrılır. Bir etiketin aktif ya da pasif yapısı güç
besleme teknig˘ine göre belirlenir. Pasif etiketlerde dahili bir güç kaynag˘ı bulunmaz.
Okuyucu tarafından gönderilen AC is¸aretler DC’ye çevrilir ve etiket içerisindeki çipin
beslemesinde kullanılır. Bununla birlikte, aktif etiketlerde dahili bir güç kaynag˘ı
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bulunur ve etiket sürekli olarak aktif durumda tutulur. Bir etiketin aktif ya da pasif
yapısı, sistemin haberles¸me mesafesi ile birlikte güvenlik seviviyesine de etki eder.
Aktif sistemlerde haberles¸me mesafesi ve güvenlik seviyesi pasif sistemlere göre daha
yüksektir.
IDTechEx tarafından yapılan bir pazar aras¸tırmasına göre, 2011 yılında 6.51 trilyon $
olan pazar payı 2012 yılında 7.67 trilyon $’a yükselmis¸tir. Buna göre, RFID, radyo
teknolojileri arasında en hızlı gelis¸en sektör haline gelmis¸tir. RFID sistemlerinin
dünya genelindeki kullanım oranına bakılırsa, yüksek ve hızla artan pazar deg˘erinin
s¸as¸ırtıcı olmadıg˘ı görülmektedir. RFID teknolojisi dünya üzerindeki birçok s¸irket
ve organizasyon tarafından stok ve tedarik zinciri, otomatik geçis¸ sistemleri, fatura
ödeme, yolcu takip sistemleri gibi birçok alanda artan bir oranla kullanılmaktadır.
RFID teknolojisinin çok farklı alanlarda uygulanabilirlig˘e sahip olması ve kullanılması
sonucu Güvenlik ve Gizlilik son zamanlarda tartıs¸ılan konular haline gelmis¸tir.
Bazı durumlarda etiketler, ait oldukları kis¸i veya es¸yalar hakkında önemli bilgi
tas¸ımaktadırlar. Çog˘u uygulamada etiketlerin dog˘rulama olmadan okuyuculara
cevap vermesi sonucu RFID etiketlerin tas¸ıdıg˘ı bilgiler istenmeyen kis¸ilerin eline
geçebilir ve bilgi sızımı gerçekles¸ebilir. Bu durumda, etiketleri tas¸ıyan kis¸iler ya da
sistemler takip etme ve gizlilik ataklarına kars¸ı korumasız hale gelmis¸ olurlar. Bu
nedenle, bazı kurulus¸ ve organizasyonlar RFID teknolojisinin endüstriyel anlamda
kullanımına kars¸ı çıkmaktadır. Yarıiletken üreticisi Philips 2003 yılında Benetton
firması için RFID etiketler üretimine bas¸ladıg˘ını bildirmis¸ti. Bu durum tüketici
gizlilig˘ine önem veren kurulus¸ ve organizasyonlar tarafından ög˘renildig˘inde Benetton
firmasına kars¸ı bir boykot eylemi bas¸latıldı ve eylemin yayılımını arttırmak için
www.boycottbenetton.com adında bir websitesi açıldı. Sonraki zamanlarda Metro,
Tesco, Gillette gibi ürünlerine RFID etiketler yerles¸tirmek isteyen firmalara kars¸ı da
benzer protestolar yapıldı.
Tartıs¸malar deg˘erlendirildig˘inde güvenli bir RFID haberles¸mesinin önemli bir sorun
oldug˘u açıkca görülmektedir. Geçmis¸te, istenmeyen 3.s¸ahıslar tarafından yapılan
ataklara kars¸ı sistem güvenlig˘inin arttırılması amacıyla bazı çalıs¸malar yapılmıs¸tır.
2005 yılında, bir grup Japon aras¸tırmacı yeniden s¸ifreleme yöntemini kullanarak
etiket kimlig˘ini deg˘is¸ken hale getirerek takip etme ataklarına kars¸ı güvenilir bir
etiket tasarımı gerçekles¸tirmis¸tir. Bas¸ka bir çalıs¸mada, okuyucu ve etiket veri
çerçeve yapılarına zaman bilgisinin eklenmesiyle Ortadaki Adam ve Yeniden Oynatma
ataklarına kars¸ı güçlü bir kimlik dog˘rulama protokolü gelis¸tirilmis¸tir.
Bazı aras¸tırma grupları etiket ve okuyucu arasındaki kimlik dog˘rulama protokollerine
odaklanırken, kripto algoritmaları üzerine de önemli miktarda çalıs¸ma yapılmaktaydı.
Israena, 2006 yılında Tiny Encryption Algorithm ve bu algoritmanın RFID
sistemlerdeki uygulamaları üzerine önemli bir çalıs¸ma gerçekles¸tirdi. Aras¸tırmacı,
TEA algoritmasının RFID sistemlerdeki avantaj ve dezavantajlarını 3 farklı
yöntem kullanarak ortaya koydu. Sonuçlara göre, algoritmanın paralel mimari
kullanılarak uygulanması karmas¸ık bir dog˘rulama algoritması 0.21mm2lik bir alanda
tasarlanabilmis¸ ve güç tüketimi 7.37uW olarak belirlenmis¸tir. Wang tarafından
yürütülen bir bas¸ka çalıs¸mada ise asimetrik anahtar kullanana Tame Transformation
Signatures ile yeni bir kimlik dog˘rulama sistemi gelis¸tirilmis¸tir.
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Bu tezin ilk as¸amasında, yeni okuyucu ve etiket yapılarının gelis¸tirilmesinin
ardından güvenli bir UHF RFID sisteminin FPGA üzerinde tasarımı yapılmıs¸ ve
gerçeklenmis¸tir. Haberles¸me mesafesini genis¸ ve güvenlik seviyesini yüksek tutmak
amacıyla sistem tasarımında aktif etiket yapısı kullanılmıs¸tır. Avrupa UHF RFID
standartları göz önüne alınarak merkez frekansı 868MHz olarak belirlenmis¸tir.
Düs¸ük güç tüketimi ve ayarlanabilir çalıs¸ma noktası özelliklerine bag˘lı olarak
Okuyucu ve etiket yapılarının alıcı verici katlarında RFM22B modülleri kullanılmıs¸tır.
I˙s¸lem kapasitesinin yüksek tutulması amacıyla mikrois¸lemci katında FPGA kitleri
kullanılmıs¸tır. Haberles¸me protokolünde 2 yönlü dog˘rulama yapan bir protokol
tercih edilmis¸tir. I˙letilen verinin kritografik olarak s¸ifrelenmesi Tiny Encryption
Algorithm ile gerçekles¸tirilmis¸tir. Sonuç olarak 64 bit veri ile kimlik dog˘rulama is¸lemi
gerçekles¸tiren bir RFID sistemi bas¸arıyla gerçeklenmis¸tir.
Tezin ikinci as¸amasında okuyucuya kars¸ı "yeniden oynatma" atakları yapılmıs¸tır. Bu
ataklar ile asıl etiketin yerine geçilerek okuyucunun gerçek etiket ile haberles¸tig˘ine
inandırılması amaçlanmıs¸tır. Bu amaçla, daha önceden tasarlanan okuyucu ve etiket
yapılarına benzer bir atak birimi tasarlanmıs¸ ve öncelikli olarak okuyucu-etiket
arasındaki haberles¸me 1000 defa dinlenmis¸tir. Dinleme sonucu elde edilen verilen
bilgisayar ortamında saklanmıs¸tır. Sonrasında, asıl etiketin aktif olmadıg˘ı durumda,
atak birimi okuyucudan gelen veriyi daha önceden kaydedilen veriyle kars¸ılas¸tırmıs¸
ve es¸les¸me oldug˘u takdirde bahsedilen okuyucu verisine cevap olan etiket verisini
okuyucuya geri göndermis¸tir. Sonuç olarak tasarlanan RFID sisteminin yeniden
oynatma ataklarına kars¸ı güvenilirlig˘i arttırılmıs¸tır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years automatic identification procedures (Auto-ID) has taken great attention
of manufacturers in industry due to great advantages and easiness they provide in
production, distribution and marketing of goods [4]. Generally, Auto-ID systems duty
is to provide information about an item in manufacture or goods in transit. However,
these systems might also be used for tracking and identifying vehicles, animals, or
individuals.
Nowadays there are several different identification systems used in applications.
Bar-coding technology has taken the lead after the invention of identification systems
since they are very cheap [4]. However the low data storage capacity distracted the
designers to find a new solution. Storing the data on a silicon chip while keeping the
design cost at low levels is the main idea behind the evaluation of smart cards [4].
Smart cards provide a lot more data storage possibility compared to bar-code labels.
Yet smart cards are unable to meet the requirements of all applications because of
their short communication range and impractical mechanical structures. Considering
mentioned systems and deficiencies, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems
came into prominence as a solution due to possibility of long range communication
and ease of manufacture.
RFID systems might be investigated in many different aspects [4]. Operating
frequency, communication range, security requirements and memory capacity are
most important criterions in RFID system design. Several issues are involved in
choosing frequency of operation. Near Field Communication (NFC) devices operate
at low frequency levels, in Low Frequency and High Frequency bands, while far field
devices operate at higher frequency bands due. Moreover, governmental frequency
allocations are effective on the selection of frequency. Communication range, security
requirements and memory capacity are much more application specific criterions. To
give example, if the distance between reader and tag is far in the application, system
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is built-up to be a long range communication system or vice-versa. Besides, security
requirements of an rfid baggage handling systems of an airport and rfid credit card are
not same as well as required memory capacity.
An RFID system consists of a reader and a tag. Tags are classified into three different
groups as active, semi-active or passive. The term active or passive is defined according
to the power supply technique of the tag. Passive tags do not have an internal power
source. Received reader signals are rectified and used to supply the tag chip. Active
tags have an internal power source and the energy is used to keep tag chip powered on
all the time. Active or passive structure of tag determines the communication range of
the system as well as the security level. Active systems provide longer range and higher
security as a result of higher power consumption while passive systems are insufficient
in both compared to active systems.
As mentioned above, many features and capabilities of RFID technology makes itself
stand out as the best identification system solution among all, resulting in high user
numbers. An RFID market research from IDTechEx claims that in 2012 the value of
the entire RFID market has raised to $ 7.67 billion, up from $6.51 billion in 2011. The
RFID market therefore belongs to the fastest growing sector of the radio technology
industry, including mobile phones and cordless telephones [7]. Higher market share
is not surprising considering the use of RFID systems used in many identification
systems all over the world. RFID technology is preferred by numerous companies
and organizations for stock and supply chain management, vehicle tracking, shipment
tracking, patient follow-up, book and document tracking, toll collection, bill payment,
passenger follow up purposes and etc.
1.1 Purpose of Thesis
Security, privacy and tracking in RFID has become hot issues recently as a result of
such a wide application spectrum of the technology [5]. Leakage of information is a
problem that occurs when data sent by tags reveals sensitive information about the
labeled items. In some cases RFID tags carry information about the objects they
are implemented on and usually, readers are not authenticated and tags answer in a
transparent and indiscriminate way. In this case, people carrying objects with RFID
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tags are vulnerable to tracking and privacy attacks. An attacker can easily find out by
reading the tags on a person’s clothes where she is shopping, or what kind of medicines
she uses and what kind of illnesses she has, where she lives, what her identity number
is, how much money she has and etc. In such a situation, personal privacy rights are
considered to be easily violated. Hence, some groups and organizations protest against
use of RFID technology in industry. In 2003, semiconductor manufacturer Philips
announced that it would supply RFID tags to clothing manufacturer Benetton [5].
When privacy advocates and organizations heard about the act, they called for a boycott
of Benetton and they even set up a web page (www.boycottbenetton.com) to inform
people about the boycott [5]. Similar acts were observed against Metro, Tesco, Gillette
in the past as they wanted to apply RFID tags in manufactured goods.
Considering the arguments, securing the communication in RFID stands to be a
problem of high importance. In first stage of this thesis, implementation of a secure
RFID protocol was carried out. To decide the communication frequency, RFID
frequency standards were researched firstly. 869MHz UHF communication for active
RFID tags used in Europe was defined as the operating frequency. Then reader and tag
stages were implemented and RF interface was completed. Following, Tiny Encryption
Algorithm (TEA) was implemented on back-end stage to take encryption precautions
and secure the data [8]. As a result design and implementation of a secure RFID
protocol is completed.
In the second stage, replay attacks were carried out on reader. By replay attacks, it was
aimed to take place of the original tag and convince the reader that original tag is in
communication range. For this purpose, an attacker device, which was similar to reader
and tag stages, was designed and the communication between reader and original tag
was listened. 1000 sample data were recorded for both 176 bit reader data and 168
bit tag response. Later on when the original tag was out of communication range,
the attacker device was used to analyze the data sent by the reader, find the proper
answer from the sample list and replay the proper answer. Lastly, some precautions
were suggested against replay attacks.
3
1.2 Related Work
To increase security against attacks by third party people and implement secure RFID
protocols, many different studies have been completed in the past. Qualified literature
research were expressed in [9] and [1]. Hash-lock scheme, randomized hash-lock
scheme and hash chain schemes were developed as early solutions to security
problems [9]. However, these schemes were vulnerable to tracking, replay and denial
of service attacks. Besides, computational cost of of randomized hash lock scheme was
high. Another proposed solution was challenge-response protocols with symmetric key
encryption schemes. Unfortunately, this method has high implementation cost and use
of single secret key technique decreases the system security against attacks. Then,
use of different secret key for each tag in the protocol was proposed as an alternative
approach. However, matching a secret key and a tag during the authentication stage
came up as a problem, and in case of large number of tag existence, computational cost
brought due to entire system operation increases.
Detailed information on existing RFID protocols is given on Table 1.1.
Cryptographic algorithms are also used for privacy and security protection of RFID
communications. Several lightweight authentication protocols have been proposed in
literature. As an early study, Hopper and Blum [15] developed the HB protocol in
2001. The protocol provides security based on learning parity with noise problem.
However, this study provides security only against passive eavesdroppers. To
implement a protocol also secure against active eavesdropping attacks, Jules and
Weis [16] proposed HB+ protocol, an enhanced version of previous HB protocol. In
2005, a new study proved the vulnerability of HB+ against a computational complex
attack by adversaries [17]. Also in [18], a new attack study on both protocols was
proposed. Later on, HB++ protocol was developed by Bringeret et al. [19], claiming
security against all known attacks. The main idea behind the protocol is increasing the
number of secret keys in both the tag and the reader. However, the HB++ protocol was
also vulnerable to active attacks [20]. Then, research of Munilla and Peinado [21] has
ended up with new HB-MP protocol, which is resistive to active attacks. In [22] [23],
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Table 1.1: Evaluation of different RFID Authentication Protocols [1].
Protocol Name HardwareRequirement
Protocol Features
Advantages Disadvantages
Hash-Lock Protocol
[10] Hash function ID is secured
Vulnerable to
replay and
tracking attacks
Randomized Hash
Lock Protocol [10]
Hash function
PRNG
ID is secured
with random
process
Vulnerable to replay
and tracking attacks,
Computational cost
is high
Hash-Chain
Agreement [11]
Two different
Hash function
Hardly tracked,
Forward secure
Vulnerable to
replay attacks
Distributed RFID
Challenge-Response
Protocol
Hash function
PRNG
Secure
transmission
High computational
cost due to
Pseudorandom
number generation
Digital Library
RFID Protocols
Pseudorandom
function,
PRNG
Secure
transmission
High computational
cost due to
Pseudorandom
number generation
Y. C. Lee and others,
Authentication
Protocol [12]
Hash function
Information
hiding
achieved,
Hard to be
tracked
One-way authenti-
cation protocol,
Vulnerable to
impersonation
attacks
HASP Protocol [13]
Hash function
PRNG
Secure
transmission
Needs Tag-Hash
calculation and
pseudorandom
number generation.
Hence, computational
cost is high
LCAP Protocol Hash function
Secure against
Tracking,
Replay and
Counterfeiting
Attacks
Vulnerable to Denial
of Service Attacks
Hash Based ID
Variation Protocol Hash function
Secure against
Tracking,
Replay and
Counterfeiting
Attacks
Vulnerable to Denial
of Service Attacks
SASI Protocol [14]
Bit operations
and shift ope-
ration
Strong
authentication
and integrity
Algorithm is weak
and may be cracked
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HB-MP protocol’s unreliability against man-in-the-middle attacks was explained. In
2008, HB# was proposed which is more secure and efficient than the HB+protocol, but
requires larger secrets and storage [24].
More protocols studies with cryptographic algorithms were analyzed in a study
completed by Safkhani et. al. [25]. Several lightweight authentication protocols have
been proposed in [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35]. However,
most of these protocols do not meet the security needs in RFID according to analyzes
in [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41] and [42].
In this study, a new communication protocol is developed and for UHF RFID
applications. Proposed work is a challenge-response protocol using cryptographic
means to secure the communication. The Tiny Encryption Algorithm is thought to
be one of the fastest and most efficient lightweight cryptographic algorithms [43] and
suitable for embedded systems that require ease of implementation, high speed, low
power consumption and low cost beside security [44]. Although equivalent keys lead
to weaknesses in related-key attacks, it still provides good security in RFID. Besides,
compared to other encryption algorithms such as DES and AES, TEA has a simpler
structure, which leads to less computational cost on microprocessors.
On the other hand, resistivity of the protocol against replay attacks was aimed.
Therefore, replay attacks were accomplished against the study. Eventhough there has
been theoretical approaches to resistivity of the proposed protocols to replay attacks
in several studies such as [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [9], [52], [53]
and [54], to our knowledge, there have not been any practical studies of replay attacks
accomplished before. Hence, proposed work has a vital role for future use in literature.
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2. RFID SYSTEMS
RFID systems are complex identification systems [55]. Therefore, many different
design parameters exist designers should pay attention to. Considering the purpose of
application such as animal identification, item management, container identification,
vehicle tracking and the application environment such as indoor,outdoor, main
parameters are defined.
The most important differentiation parameters are operating frequency of the reader,
physical coupling method between reader and tag and the range of the system.
2.1 Frequency, Range and Coupling
In radio communications, the main idea is to separate communication channels
with frequency allocation and so to operate many different systems in a frequency
interval [55]. This operation is mainly controlled by governmental organizations all
around the world, with different parts of electromagnetic spectrum being assigned for
different purposes.
RFID systems operate in widely different frequencies, ranging from 135kHz to
5.8GHz. Most commonly encountered frequency bands are 125/135 kHz, 13.56 MHz,
860-960 MHz, 2.4-2.5 GHz and 5.4-6.8GHz [2].
Figure 2.1: RFID Frequency Bands [2].
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The most important differentiation criteria for RFID systems are the operating
frequency of the reader, the physical coupling method and the range of the system [4].
Actually, operating frequency of a system has a big influence on defining the coupling
method between reader and tag. Electromagnetic waves travel in space at the speed of
light, c=300.000 km/s. Considering also the frequency of operation, wavelength of an
electromagnetic wave is defined by,
λ = c/ f (2.1)
Thus the wavelength of a wave will be 3km in 100kHz and 1 cm in 5GHz. As clearly
seen, the wavelength is very long in short frequencies. Therefore, low frequency
systems and high frequency systems differ in coupling techniques.
Figure 2.2: Antenna type difference in passive tags depending on frequency and
coupling [2].
2.1.1 Inductive Coupling
Inductive coupling systems are near field communication systems. Energy is
transferred from reader to tag via the mutual inductances of the antennas. When a tag
is in proper range of antenna, a voltage level is induced in tag and tag powers up with
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rectification of the voltage [4]. To transmit data from tag to reader, tag changes the load
on its coil and magnetic changes are detected by reader. LF and HF systems mainly
operate on inductive coupling basis [4]. Because of enormous sizes of wavelengths in
LF and HF bands, implementation of a suitable antenna for RFID applications is not
possible, considering the varying lambda/4 lengths above 100m.
2.1.2 Radiative Coupling
Certain RFID systems operate on radiative coupling basis [4]. In this type of a
coupling, the reader emits radio waves through a dipole antenna to the tag, which
is in meters distance. All of RFID systems with radiative coupling function performs
at UHF frequencies and microwave frequencies. In passive tags, data transmission
from tag to the reader is be done by modulating and backscattering received signals
and communication ranges of 3-4m are achieved, while ranges of above 15m can
even be achieved using semi-active backscatter transponders [4]. Active transponders
are capable of transmitting radio waves using power supply. In these systems,
communication ranges of 100m and above is possible regarding to the receive
sensitivity.
2.2 System Components
RFID systems are categorized into three main subsystems, reader, tag and database [2].
Database: Database is data storage where the useful information is stored to be used
by the reader. Registered Tag ID numbers are stored in database. No further details
will be given about database since it is not an important design parameter in this
thesis.
Reader: Readers are the devices used for control, verification and tracking of tags.
In general, main structure and operation of readers do not differ much in different
systems. Readers consists of an RF front-end stage for RF communication and
a baseband stage, where useful data is processed. Readers are used for tracking,
receiving information from tags and authentication control purposes. Production
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of portable and stable readers is possible. Selection of the proper type of reader
depends on the aim of application.
Tag: On the other hand, RFID tags are the devices which defines important parameters
in an RFID system. According to the structure of a tag, range, coupling and
antenna type and communication protocol changes in RFID systems. RFID tags
are also called transponders, a term comes from TRANSmitter and resPONDER,
and the most important distinction between RFID systems is how the transponders
are supplied in terms of energy [2].
Passive and active transponders are two main transponder types in RFID.
2.2.1 Passive Tags
Passive transponders do not have a power supply [2]. In this structure, tags are supplied
by regulating the incoming signals of readers. Data transmission from tag to reader is
done by backscattering the signals sent by reader. Received signals are analyzed by
transponder chip after power is supplied. Then the tag activates and deactivates a Field
Effect Transistor (FET) through a pin depending on the data stored on it. When the FET
is active, received signal is short-circuited to the ground and there is no backscattering,
but when the FET is inactive, received signal is backscattered to the reader. Hence,
modulation of the received data is completed and data transmission from tag to reader
is completed.
This type of communication between transponder and reader may also be called
passive communication [4]. In passive type of communication, tag and reader are
coupled inductively. Hence, if the tags are not in close proximity to reader, there
is no data transmission from tag to reader since the tag can not be supplied. Very
simple protocols must me used in readers to minimize power consumption, hence
the computational power of a passive tag is low. Link improving techniques such
as error-correcting codes, interleaving, gain adjustment and retransmission are not
practical for passive tags due to limited computational power. Moreover, security and
privacy are compromised in passive tags as implementation of complex cryptographic
algorithms are not possible due to limited resources [2].
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Figure 2.3: Passive Tag Structure [2].
There is also semi-passive type of RFID transponders, but the subject is not examined
in this thesis. Basically, semi passive tags are advanced types of passive tags
with power supply implementation, provide larger communication range with larger
memory size.
2.2.2 Active Tags
In active transponder structure, a power supply unit is implemented in the circuit [2].
Active transponders have an RF front-end to receive-transmit signals. When the reader
signal is received, firstly the signal is downconverted to baseband signals. Following,
data is analyzed by microcontroller stage and the response data is encrypted and
transmitted to the radio stage. In the radio stage, baseband signal is attached on RF
carrier signal and then transmitted to air by antenna to the reader.
When compared to passive tags, the electromagnetic field may be much weaker than
the field required for operating a passive transponder [2]. Therefore, communication
range is higher in active transponders. Due to other physical mechanisms and taking
into account the permitted transmitting power, short-range devices can have a range of
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Figure 2.4: Active Tag Structure [2].
up to several hundred meters. Moreover, active transponders have larger data storage
capacity.
Active tags have capability of communicating with amplitude modulation as
passive tags and modulation and demodulation of more sophisticated phase-based
modulations(phase-shift keying, PSK, frequency shift keying, FSK, and quadrature
amplitude modulation, QAM), which provides more efficient use of spectrum and
better Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) values [2]. Application of high-rate Code-Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) techniques are possible in active tags to allow multiple tags
reuse the same frequency band.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, the most important parameters in an RFID system were presented,
which are frequency of operation, coupling method and tag architectures. Firstly,
RFID frequency bands were presented and features of these bands were revealed.
Effects of frequency on coupling method between reader and tag was expressed.
Following, RFID system components were mentioned and different tag architectures
were presented. Frequency of operation is the primary matter of selection. Coupling
method and tag selections are defined according to the frequency and possible
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communication range of the systems. In high frequency bands, active tags are used and
radiative coupling method is applied to provide high communication range. However,
in systems operating in HF and VHF band, inductive coupling is preferred due to long
wavelengths. Besides, passive tag structure is preferred for systems operating in low
frequency ranges.
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3. RADIO BASICS FOR UHF RFID
Radio frequency planning is a key part of network deployment and is essential for
wireless networks [56]. Insufficient network planning leads to decrease in system
performance and network quality and increase in power consumption. Furthermore,
total cost of the whole system may also increase. To prevent mentioned disadvantages,
designers should pay enough attention to RF planning of a communication link.
Link budget and Free Space Path Loss parameters should be understood very firstly to
have a good understanding of propagation of radio waves.
3.1 Link Budget
Link Budget is the sum of calculations of all gains and losses in the environment
a wave travels from the transmitter, through medium to the receiver in a wireless
communication system [2]. Link budget is a way of quantifying the link performance.
The received power in a communication link is determined by four different factors,
which are transmit power, transmitting antenna gain, losses in medium and receiving
antenna gain. If transmitted power minus the losses in the link path is greater than the
receive sensitivity of the receiving radio, then communication is possible.
Link margin is a result of link budget calculations and is used for telling the difference
between required power level and system power level. Link margin can be expressed
as:
LinkMargin = EIRP−Lpath +GRx +T HRx (3.1)
where
• EIRP is the effective isotropically radiated power in W or dBm,
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• Lpath is the total path loss, including miscellaneous losses, reflections, and fade
margins in dB,
• GRx is the receive gain in dB,
• T HRx is the receiver sensitivity.
3.2 Propagation of Radio Waves
Propagation of radio waves may interrupted by the materials in the area of
propagation.Hence, to make a true analyze, propagation of radio waves can be
researched in two different category.
3.2.1 Free space path loss (FSPL)
Free space path loss is the loss in signal strength of an electromagnetic wave that would
result from a line-of-sight path through free space with no obstacles nearby to cause
reflection or diffraction.
Free-space path loss is proportional to the square of the distance between the
transmitter and receiver, and also proportional to the square of the frequency of the
radio signal, hence to the wavelength. Free space path loss formula is:
FSPL =
Pt
Pr
= (
4pi
λ
)2dn (3.2)
where
• d is distance from transmitter in meters,
• λ is wavelength in meters,
• Pt is transmitted power from transmitter,
• Pr is received power.
Considering the Friis transmission equation, free space path loss of a signal in a
communication system becomes:
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FSPL =
Pt
Pr
=
1
Gt
1
Gr
(
4pi
λ
)2dn (3.3)
where
• Gt is transmitter antenna gain,
• Gr is receiver antenna gain.
Equation can be expressed in dB as:
FSPL =
Pt
Pr
= 20log(λ )−20log(d)−Gt−Gr +22 (3.4)
In given equations here, receiver and transmitter antenna gains are calculated, but
mostly free space path loss formula is given without antenna gains, as in Equation 3.2.
Propagation constant, n, in free space path loss formula which effects attenuation due
to distance differs in different mediums. In spaces where the number of objects that
effect propagation is less, n gets the value 2.
3.2.2 Propagation in real world
Wireless communication channels have many parameters and are much more complex
compared to wired communication systems. Due to high number of interrogators,
communication links and environments are modeled with specific techniques. Signal
power levels and environmental effects are researched and analyzed in these models.
Three main effects are considered in large scale propagations. Alongside with
attenuation of signal in free space due to path loss, reflection, scattering and diffraction
of radio waves effect the continuity of propagation. On the other hand, in small scale
propagations, multipath effects comes into prominence in indoor environments.
3.2.2.1 Reflection
During the propagation, if the waves crash to an object larger than the wavelength,
some part of the wave reflects back while remaining part penetrates into the crashed
object. If the object is a perfect conductor, all the wave is reflected back and no
attenuation occurs on signal strength. In other case, if the material is not a perfect
conductor, attenuation occurs on the signal strength and reflection is calculated by
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Fresnel Reflection Coefficient (Γ)17. Value of fresnel coefficient depends on reflection
angle, frequency and radio wave polarization type18.
3.2.2.2 Scattering
Scattering happens at the corners of the objects which have greater dimensions than the
wavelength and leads to diffraction. It can provide communication link without line
of sight. Scattering provides many advantages in GSM applications and some other
closed area applications where radio waves face a lot of barriers.
3.2.2.3 Diffraction
In some cases, objects, which radio waves meet, may have equal dimensions close to
the wavelength19. If radio waves crash to the objects, waves spread away in a lot more
directions than in scattering. Diffraction is the hardest parameter in modeling studies.
3.2.3 Indoor propagation
Most important characteristics of an indoor RF propagation environment are existence
of multipath reflections, absence of line-of-sight path and possible change of
environment characteristics over a very short time or distance [56]. Communication
ranges generally tend to be short. Walls, doors, furniture, and people may be the source
of attenuation on signal strength. In this kind of an environment, propagation is much
more related to reflection, scattering, diffraction and penetration. Delay and Doppler
Effect are not of great importance since the range is significantly short and the speed
of field transceiver is not much.
Many different models were developed for indoor propagation modeling up to date
in wireless communications. In this study, path loss model prepared by International
Telecommunications Union is mentioned.
3.2.3.1 The ITU indoor path loss model
The ITU model for site-general indoor propagation path loss prediction is:
Ltotal = 20log10 ( f )+N log10 (d)+L f (n)−28dB (3.5)
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where
• N is the distance power loss coefficient,
• f is the frequency in MegaHertz,
• d is the distance in meters (d > 1m),
• L f (n) is the floor penetration loss factor,
• n is the number of floors between the transmitter and the receiver.
Calculated N and L f (n) values are given in tables below.
Table 3.1: Power Loss Coefficient Values, N, for the ITU Site-General Indoor
Propagation Model.
Frequency Residential Office Commercial
900 MHz - 33 20
1.2-1.3 GHz - 32 22
1.8-2 GHz 28 30 22
4 GHz - 28 22
5.2 GHz - 31 -
60 GHz - 22 17
Table 3.2: Floor Penetration Loss Factor, L f (n), for the ITU Site-General Indoor
Propagation Model.
Frequency Residential Office Commercial
900 MHz - 9(n=1) -
- 19(n=2) -
24(n=3) -
1.8-2 GHz 4n 15+4(n-1) 6+3(n-1)
5.2 GHz - 16(n=1 only) -
N=20 power loss coefficient value corresponds to free space loss, which is applied
in open areas. In corridors, RF signal is channeled by the walls. Hence, power loss
coefficient equals to N=18, which is less than free space loss. On the other hand, N=40
value is used for propagation through walls or over corners since the attenuation is
higher.
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The ITU indoor path loss model is a site-general model for indoor path loss calculation.
There are several more site-general models and also many site-specific models exist
in research history. Site-specific models are generally application based empirical
models.Hence, they are not further investigated in this thesis due to disinterest with
thesis subject. ITU model is preferred for future link margin calculations in the thesis.
3.3 Bit Error Rate Analysis
In an ideal case, a bit sequence transmitted into a transmission channel is expected to
be received at output without any errors. However, in real conditions, it is hampered
by undesired noise signals in transmission channels. The ratio of bit error number in
entire transmission channel to the number of transmitted bits gives bit error rate [57].
BER =
numbero f erroneousbits
numbero f totalbits
(3.6)
Signal to noise ratios and Eb/No figures are parameters that are more associated with
radio links and radio communications systems [58].
Eb
N0
(dB) =C−N0−10log( fb) (3.7)
where
• Eb is energy per bit (dBm/Hz)
• N0 is noise spectral density (dBm/Hz)
• C is carrier power (dBm)
• fb is transmission bit rate
Errors occurring in a transmission channel has a random nature, meaning the errors
may not be constant [57]. Therefore, to detect the real bit error rate, infinite number
of bits should be transmitted in the channel which is not possible. Accordingly,
different techniques have been used to detect bit error rates. Bit error rate calculation
is a statistical method used to detect bit error rates. A BER calculated with the
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method converges to real case as the number of transmitted bits converges to infinite.
Nowadays, BER calculation of most systems is defined with calculated BER’s being
higher or lower than a predefined threshold BER, considered not to be much effective
on the communication, and there exist a Confidence Level term related to this
comparison. Confidence level is the ratio of tests, in which measured BERs is lower
than the threshold BER level.
CL = 1− eNbit∗BER
′
(3.8)
where
• Nbit is the number of transmitted bits
• BER′ is predefined threshold level
It should be noted that each different type of modulation has its own value for the error
function [58]. Each different modulation type performs different in presence of noise
signals. Modulation types which can carry higher data rates are as robust as lower
order modulation formats that offer lower data rates. Hence, BER of a communication
link differs in different modulation types while preserving the range.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, link calculation of radio systems were presented. At the beginning,
basic term of link budget was expressed. Following, propagation of radio waves was
mentioned and free space effects on a radio wave was given in details. Considering the
free space path loss, a radio wave’s power level decreases proportional to the square of
distance due to Friis equation. Besides, reflection, scattering and diffraction are three
important parameters that effect a propagating radio wave in real world environment.
Radio waves do not behave as in free space while propagating in real world. Hence,
different parameters are considered in real world link budget calculations. To make
generalization, there are two possible environment of propagation in real world,
indoor and outdoor. Outdoor calculations are relative or almost same as free space
calculations. However, many effects are considered on indoor propagation. To
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make precise calculations, indoor links are often modeled specifically. Wide variety
of indoor propagation models exist in literature. However, the site-general model
proposed by International Telecommunications Union is presented in this study. Lastly,
bit error analysis in communication systems are explained.
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4. SECURITY IN RFID
Compared to rest of automatic identification systems, RFID systems have substantial
advantages, most importantly providing communication without the need of line
of sight and easy tracking [3]. In parallel with these features, use of RFID
systems is increasing day by day in every corner of daily life. Patient tracking
systems in hospitals, vehicle tracking, supply chain management and stock tracking
in warehouses, toll collection systems in highways are several examples of RFID
applications.
Despite RFID is blooming without restraint in automatic identification systems
industry, security and privacy have become hot issues recently [5].
4.1 Main Security Concerns
4.1.1 Privacy
Leakage of information is a problem that occurs when data sent by tags reveals
sensitive information about the labeled items. In some cases RFID tags carry
information about the objects they are implemented on and usually, readers are not
authenticated and tags answer in a transparent and indiscriminate way. In this case,
people carrying objects with RFID tags are vulnerable to tracking and privacy attacks.
Several types of RFID tags are very small in dimensions and these tags can be
embedded in clothes, shoes, books, key cards, prescription bottles and a stranger in
public can easily find out by reading the tags where she is shopping, or what kind
of medicines she uses and what kind of illnesses she has, where she lives, what her
identity number is, how much money she has and etc. In such a situation, personal
privacy rights are considered to be easily violated.
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Figure 4.1: Manufactured goods with RFID tags [3].
4.1.2 Tracking
Location privacy is another subject in consideration of privacy [3]. Certainly RFID
systems are not the only possible way of tracking individuals. Tracking an individual
is quite easy if the person has a mobile phone. Each time a cell phone makes reasonable
location change, it connects to a new cell in that region. By this means, a mobile phone
operator can easily track customers. In means of RFID, by suitably placing readers,
tracking people with RFID transponders becomes very easy. To give example, RFID
chips are placed in your shoes by vendor, the company can easily track individuals
location, when the individual go or quit home, which malls she visits and can sell this
information to third party organizations. Collecting the location data of people, these
organizations could send the person personalized advertising information depending
on her shopping habits [59].
Recently, a high school student’s refusal to wear the school’s badge with RFID chip in
Texas, USA has been the center of debates in RFID tracking [60]. Andrea Hernandez,
16 year old student, refuses to wear RFID enabled school badge since she doesn’t want
to be tracked during school time. In November, she was notified by the district that she
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Figure 4.2: RFID Attacks [4].
will not be able to attend her current John Jay High School if she refuses to wear school
badge.
On the other hand, implementation of individual product codes on manufactured goods
are being considered nowadays. If the technology is presented to the market in
following years, every individual will be easily matched with product that has the
specific RFID code and tracking will become so easy as finding a needle in haystack.
4.2 RFID Attacks
It is mentioned in earlier stages that an RFID system consists of different stages
and these stages should be considered separately to fully analyze radio frequency
identification systems. In this section, possible attack on RFID systems are presented.
Classification of RFID attacks are visualized in Figure3.2.
4.2.1 Attacks on transponder
Transponders are easily accessed part of RFID systems. Hence, vulnerability of
transponders against attacks is high. Several attacks on RFID transponders are
considered in this section.
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4.2.1.1 Permanently disabling tags
Tag Removal-Transponders that are not embedded in goods may easily be removed or
placed in another product. Switching price tags of manufactured goods is an example
of this kind of an attack. An attacker can easily replace the price tag of an expensive
product with a cheaper one and pay less at the cash point. Tag removal is not a complex
process and does not require high technical skills for an individual to carry out, hence
this is a mostly faced problem in shopping malls and markets.
Tag Destruction- Operating features and physical limitations of RFID tags are defined
considering predefined standards with proper power regulations [61]. Generally,
readers are prohibited to emit higher power level radio waves than a predefined limit
and inductive systems are set to induct sufficient voltage level on tags. An attacker
with suitable technical equipment can transmit high power level signals to a radiatively
coupled RFID tag and destroy the tag. Similarly inductively coupled tags also suffer
from high voltage levels induced by coil antenna. Moreover, electrostatic discharge
also leads to malfunction of RFID tags [61].
4.2.1.2 Temporarily disabling tags
RFID tags may disappear for a short period of time instead of malfunctioning at
all [59]. Temporarily disabling may be either intentionally or unintentionally. A stealer
may cover the RFID tag of a product with a material to constitute faraday cage and can
pass any security check without any alert. Furthermore, radio interference can lead to
temporarily disabling of a tag. Moreover, it is possible to tune receiver antenna of a
tag. In inductive coupling systems, a simple piece of a metal in contact with the coils
of the antenna changes the resonant frequency and so the inductance. In backscattering
systems, antennas are tuned to a different frequency by the help of different materials
such as air, water, etc8 [4].
In general, RFID systems operate in a noisy environment and the communication
between tag and reader is susceptible to any interference and collisions from other
radio transmitters close to the system. On the other hand, an attacker can place a
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transmitter system close to the reader, and interfere with the communication of reader
and tag.
4.2.1.3 Spoofing and cloning tags
Read-only transponders suddenly responds when they enter to a electromagnetic field
without any authentication of the reader [59]. Hence, an attacker with proper reader can
possibly listen to the response of the tag and store the received data. After embedding
the data in another tag and counterfeiting the original one, manipulating the reader
becomes possible. If the copy tag enters communication zone of the reader, it sends
the same data as the original tag and reader does not notice any difference since the
data sent by read-only tags does not change by time.
In transponders with accessible memories, the chance of cloning the tag relies on
authentication protocols used by tag. Possibility of counterfeiting is reduced or even
prevented by implementation of authentication protocols or password, key techniques
in tags [4].
4.2.2 Attacks on RF interface
In RF interface, as the data transmission between tag and reader is completed through
air, communication link between is open to several types of attacks. An attacker could
pose threats to the system even from distances away without the knowledge of the
operator.
4.2.2.1 Eavesdropping
According to the frequency of communication and reader-tag output power levels,
the communication can be eavesdropped from distance, ranging from 3-4 meters for
near field communication systems to a few hundred meters for active communication
systems in UHF band [4].
It is observed that communication of inductively coupled systems can be intercepted
from 3 meters distance [4]. An attacker can record the communication and store it for
later attacks called Replay Attacks. Data transmission between reader and tag occurs
in two ways, from reader to tag and from tag to reader. As reader transmits more
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powerful signals to have a wider range, it may be eavesdropped farther than tag to
reader.
On the other hand, in active RFID communication in UHF band, readers and tags
outputs high power levels, which in turn allows for eavesdropping from a hundred
meters or a few kilometers away. However, reflection of radio waves from metallic
surfaces in the environment and walls in indoor areas, the range is limited in shorter
distances.
4.2.2.2 Jamming
Jammer devices are used to produce noise signals in a definite frequency band, hence
prevents operation of any other transmitters in that frequency interval. Jamming a
system relies on many different parameters. An attacker either should be in close range
of the communication link to suppress the signals between reader and tag, or should
transmit signals with high power level. To jam inductively coupled systems, the field
strength between coil antennas should be suppressed.
Applying jamming techniques has other downsides. Using jammers is illegal and often
forbidden by law. As an addition, the jammer signal is easy to detect and can be located
easily.
4.2.2.3 Denial of service
Modern RFID systems have capability of dealing with many transponders in their
interrogation fields. These kind of multitag systems use anticollision algorithms to
communicate with a specific transponder in once. Even some systems determine which
transponder to communicate with through use of serial numbers.
Exactly in this kind of applications, some specific tags called blocker tags interfere
with the system. A blocker tag always sends ones and zeros simultaneously and
simulates collision at each bit location of the tree, hence mislead the reader. Taking
into account the received information, the reader presumes that there are 2k tags, where
k is the number of bits in serial number. As a result such large number of tags block
the reader [4]. This type of an attack is called Denial of Service attack.
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4.2.2.4 Relay attacks
In relay attacks, attacker convinces the reader that the transponder is still in field
interrogation even though transponder is somewhere else. The operation relies on
extending the communication range by using transceiver equipment that transmit
signals from reader to transponder and vice versa.
Relay equipment has two stages to communicate with reader and tag. The component
located close to the reader is ghost, which is capable of receiving reader’s signals
and create load modulation to communicate with reader instead of transponder. Other
component close to the transponder, called leech, transmit signals to power up the tag
and receives modulated signal, so the information stored on the tag.
Figure 4.3: Relay attack [4].
In relay attacks, runtime for the transmission of data forth and back might be a problem.
As the distance between ghost and leech increases, transmission duration of data
increases identically. Hence, relay attacks may fail in a time-critical protocol like
ISO/IEC 14442 Type A [2].
To give an example, a relay attack could be used to charge a victim’s RFID card
for the payments. In 2007, Roel Verdult, an MSc. student from Raboud University
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of Nijmegen has successfully performed relay attacks on Dutch Public Transport
Cards [62].
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5. READER AND TRANSPONDER DESIGN
Security concerns in RFID systems are deeply investigated in previous section.
Moreover, RFID attack techniques are mentioned and some examples are given for
proposed attacks. Considering the shortfalls of RFID systems in security, design and
implementation of a secure RFID protocol on FPGA is proposed in this thesis and
replay attacks were completed on the protocol.
In this section, design and implementation of the communication system, which
consists of reader and tag, is revealed step by step.
5.1 Determination of Operating Frequency
In RFID systems, frequency of operation is defined considering the purpose of
application and the conditions in the environment where the system will operate.
In this study, communication system was desired to have long communication range
together with low reflection compared to high frequency applications. Therefore, UHF
frequency band is selected as communication frequency between reader and tag. UHF
band is wide frequency band ranging from 300 MHz to 3GHz. Exact center frequency
of the systems is determined considering RFID regulations in UHF band. Frequency
intervals used for UHF applications in RFID are different all around the world due
to regulations and restrictions of governments. In Europe, 865-868 MHz frequency
band is defined as UHF RFID communication frequency range. To comply with the
regulation, 868MHz center frequency is selected for the system.
5.2 Communication Protocol
In order to secure the communication between tag and reader and apply authentication,
several authentication protocols are used in RFID systems suitable with the standards.
Data transfer between reader and tag must be accomplished in definite data frame in
31
accordance with the protocols. In this study, a simple two way challenge-response
communication protocol is used for authentication. The basis of the study is the
authentication protocol proposed by Martin Feldhofer in 2004.
Figure 5.1: Data frame of reader signal.
Figure 5.1 reflects the structure of reader signal data frame. Each meaningful data
presented within the frame is explained below.
Flags: Flags form up the first byte of transmit data frame. They are used to indicate
to transponder what data rate and carrier frequency should be used for the response
signal.
Command Code: Following byte is called command code which is used to give
information about the required command.
Manufacturer Code (IC Mfg Code): Any custom command contains as its first
parameter the IC manufacturer code (IC Mfg code). This allows IC manufacturers
to implement specific custom commands without risking duplication of command
codes and thus cause misinterpretation.
User Identity (UID): 64 bit UID data addresses a unique tag to respond to the
transmitted data. This UID must first be retrieved from the tag by the inventory
request.
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC): CRC is a technique used for detecting errors
in digital data, but not for making corrections when errors are detected. In the
CRC method, transmitter calculates a checksum value on data to be sent using
a predefined polynomial before sending the message and attaches the value to
the transmit data frame. Upon receiving the data, receiver completes the same
calculations using the same polynomial and creates a checksum. If the received and
calculated checksum values match in the receiver stage, the message sent by the
32
reader is received without any errors. Any other case is a result of errors in received
data and if an error occurred, the receiver sends a negative acknowledgement back
to the sender, requesting the message to be retransmitted. 16 bit CRC value is
placed at the end of frame before the delimiter.
As seen in Figure 5.2, tag data frame is shorter than reader data frame. In tag data
frame, command code and manufacturer code bytes are not included since tag operates
as a slave device. It can only accomplish the proposed tasks but give commands to the
reader.
Figure 5.2: Data frame of tag signal.
5.2.1 Authentication
To give details on authentication, a random 64bit number is firstly sent to the
transponder in a proper data frame. Received data is encrypted and then sent back
to the reader. Following, the reader decrypts the received data and compares with
the data sent to transponder. If received and sent data match with each other, reader
authenticates the transponder.
5.2.2 Encryption Algorithm
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) is a cryptographic algorithm used to secure data
transfer between reader and tag. TEA is an advantageous algorithm due to quite short
runtime and low memory use. TEA produces two different 32 bit output data, using a
128 bit encryption key.
Figure 5.3: Visualization of input and outputs of TEA module.
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64 byte input data enters the algorithm as two different 32 byte signals. The load data
entered together with the input data enhances the transfer of input data from registers
to variables and initiates the algorithm. The data is encrypted or decrypted with the
use of 128bit key hidden in the design and sent to the output as two different 32 byte
data. Completion of process is verified by done bit. TEA is used in this study to secure
the transferred data.
5.3 RF Front-End Modules
RFM22B Transceiver Modules manufactured by Hope Microelectronics are used as RF
front-end modules in the system. The modules have -121dBm receive sensitivity and
are capable of outputting signal with +20dBm power level at maximum. Calculating
the free space path loss at frequency of operation, maximum communication range of
the modules is quite long in free space.
Table 5.1: RFM22B RF Module Features.
Parameter Value
Frequency Range 433/470/868/915 MHz ISM Bands
Receive Sensitivity -121dBm
Max Output Power 100mW
Supply Voltage 1.8-3.6V
Receive Power Consumption 60mW
Transmit Power Consumption 280mW (max case)
Modulation FSK, GFSK, OOK
Data Rate 0.123 to 256 kbps
RFM22B modules are versatile devices to be used in a wide frequency range for
different purposes. As seen in table below, modules are capable of operating at
different ISM bands. Moreover, using the frequency deviation feature, device can
be programmed to operate in different carrier frequency bands ranging from 240MHz
to 960MHz. Due to high capabilities of the chips, RFM22B modules may be used
in many applications such as remote control, home security and alarm, telemetry,
personal data logging, tire pressure monitoring, wireless PC peripherals, tag readers
and etc.
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Modules were used as RF front-end modules in reader-tag devices in this project.
Devices were connected to FPGA boards to be programmed and supplied in terms
of power. Microblaze, which is software based microcontroller on FPGA board,
was used as microcontroller to program the modules and set the desired operation
parameters. Required program was designed in C programming language. Modules
were programmed to work at 868MHz center frequency with GFSK modulation. Data
rate was set to 9.6 kbps.
Table 5.2: Specified operation values.
Parameter Value
Center Frequency 868MHz
Output Power 100mW
Supply Voltage 3.3V
Receive Power Consumption 18.5mA (60mW)
Transmit Power Consumption 85mA (280mW)
Modulation GFSK
Data Rate 9.6kbps
Bit Error Rate BER < %0.1
RFM22B modules have a characteristic data frame to decrease the number of processes
on microcontroller and increase the communication speed. Bytes sent before the data
handles detection, synchronization and addressing issues. Automatically adding these
fields to the data payload greatly reduces the amount of communication between the
microcontroller and the RFM22B/23B and reduces the required computational power
of the microcontroller.
Figure 5.4: Implementation of reader/tag data frame to RFM22B data frame.
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Desired data to be sent is placed in data part of RFM22B frame as a whole reader/tag
frame. As visible, RFM22B’s are also capable of calculating the CRC value of the data
being sent. However, this option is not preferred in order to have ease of design within
the designed algorithm.
5.4 Reader and Tag Design
An RFID reader device consists of front-end and back-end stages. As already
mentioned before, RFM22B modules were used in front-end stage. On the other hand,
an FPGA was preferred in microcontroller stage due to high computational power.
Hence, Spartan-3E starter board constitutes baseband stages of transponder and tag.
Following sections give detailed info about the hardware and software design of reader.
5.4.1 Hardware
Xilinx Embedded Development Kit(EDK) was used to define the hardware
specifications of FPGA kits. In this program, user selects the desired features
of FPGA board and sets up the hardware configuration. EDK is a platform to
create and change hardware configuration of the board using algorithms designed in
Hardware Description Language like Verilog and VHDL. On the other hand, Software
Development Kit (SDK) of Xilinx is used to control the hardware configuration
by software. For this feature, hardware design in EDK should be transferred to
SDK. After transferring process, it is possible to develop an algorithm to control the
configuration using C programming language. A board support package is provided
for communicating and programming with hardware submodules through Microblaze.
5.4.1.1 TEA-Microblaze communication
In this study, TEA algorithm is proposed as a hardware submodule (IP Core) in FPGA
design. An IP Core should be firstly defined to Microblaze to allow data transmission in
between. For this purpose, TEA module is defined in EDK as a peripheral firstly. TEA
algorithm is integrated to the design by changing verilog file created by the template
in EDK. Utility of TEA module is tested and verified in Project Navigator using test
vectors.
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Figure 5.5: Microblaze and TEA communication block diagram.
In order to transmit data generated by TEA module to the outside world, the data
should be sent to RF transceiver modules through Microblaze. Hence, addressing
of the module is done in EDK and the hardware design is transferred to SDK for
software based controlling tests. In this section, designed TEA module is connected
via Microblaze by a simple code that is created by using the functions defined in board
support package libraries of SDK design.
5.4.2 Reader Algorithm
Reader algorithm starts with initial functions. After running the functions and making
slave devices such as RFM22B RF modules and other submodules ready for operation,
algorithm enters to communication mode. After the initial section, reader algorithm
consists of two different parts, Data Send Loop and Data Receive Loop which are
actually two different for loops running in another common for loop.
Data Send Loop: Send loop is the first loop between two loops, since the reader is
responsible for starting the communication with the tag. Random number data should
be sent periodically for any tag that might appear in the range. Below diagram is the
flow chart of data send loop of reader algorithm.
In data send loop, reader firstly generates random numbers and prepares the data
frame with bitwise operations. Then, CRC checksum is calculated by implemented
CRC algorithm. Calculated value is added as last two bytes of the frame just before
the EOF delimiter for CRC comparison operation in tag stage. Upon completing
CRC operations, data is written to RFM22B first-in-first-out(FIFO) registers over SPI
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Figure 5.6: Reader algorithm, data send loop flow chart.
link. When all frame, 176 bit reader data, is written on FIFO, "data ready to sent
acknowledgement" is sent to RFM22B and the module transmits the data to the air
over an UHF antenna.
Next, reader starts to wait for an incoming tag response. The length of timeout is set
to be higher than the total duration of forward transmission, data process in tag and
38
backward transmission. In case of data reception, RFM22B generates an interrupt and
pulls down the NIRQ pin. If any data is received during timeout, reader enters to the
next loop, data receive loop. Else, waits till the end of timeout, when parameter k
reaches 10000, and goes back to the beginning of the loop, position I.
Data Receive Loop: Receive loop is the second loop that comes after send loop.
During the operation, reader algorithm does not run the receive loop section all the
time. Receive loop runs only in case of received data presence. Block diagram below
reflects the flow chart of receive loop.
Figure 5.7: Reader algorithm, data receive loop flow chart.
In receive loop, reader firstly checks for CRC value of received data and takes the next
action considering the result of comparison between received and calculated checksum
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Figure 5.8: Tag algorithm flow chart block diagram.
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values. If equality does not hold between two values, reader informs the tag and
algorithm goes back to command II in send loop. However, as the match occurs
between CRC values, reader decrypts the tag data and compares is with the data sent.
Authentication ends positively in case of correct data reception. In any other cases, tag
is not authenticated, reader exits the receive loop and goes back to command I in send
loop.
5.4.3 Tag Algorithm
Tag is the listener device in the communication protocol. Since communication starts
with the data sent by reader, tag waits for the proper signal to respond. Flow chart of
the tag algorithm is given in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.9: Reader and Tag Structures.
Upon running the initial functions after start command, tag starts to wait for reader
data. If any 176 bit data is received, CRC checksum calculation is done and
received-calculated values are compared by tag. In positive match case, 64 bit random
number data sent to TEA IP Core by Microblaze, and encrypted data is saved on a
buffer after the process. Then, tag prepares the data frame to send response to reader
device. Just before sending, CRC value of the new data is calculated and added as last
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two bytes of the frame before the EOF delimiter. Upon completing CRC operations,
data is firstly sent to RFM22B and then transmitted to the reader.
5.5 Overall Design
Completed design is visible in 5.9. RFM22B modules are connected to the suitable
ports of FPGA boards. To make the FPGA operate, bitmap of the designed architecture
should be embedded. By embedding the reader and tag codes at each FPGA, RFID
system gets ready for operation.
Indoor area communication range of the system is approximately 100m. Power supply
of the RF transceivers are provided by FPGA board. Dipole antennas are used on RF
modules. Output power of each transceiver is set to 100mW.
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6. ATTACKS ON THE PROTOCOL
In this section of thesis, completed replay attack studies on proposed communication
protocol are explained. At first, theory of attack operation is mentioned. Following,
attack device design stages are explained. Lastly, attack implementations are given in
details and results are reflected.
6.1 Fundamentals of Operation
The aim of the replay attacks was to spoof the reader as the original tag is in range
and protocol runs correctly. In other words attacker device acted as the original tag.
To accomplish the attacks, the data sent over communication between reader and tag
was recorded in first phase. In second phase collected data were replayed by attacker
device in the second phase.
Figure 6.1 delineates the attacking operation.
6.2 Attack Device Design
Attack device is almost same as reader and tag structures, but there is an additional
personal computer (PC) stage, which is used to record and save the data for replay
attacks.
6.2.1 Hardware
Attack device is formed up using RFM22B module at RF front end and Spartan3E
FPGA board for baseband processes. In order to implement the proposed replay
attacks, received data needed to be saved, but the memory blocks on Spartan3E board
are not enough for this kind of an operation. Hence, collected data needed to be
saved on external memory device. To overcome the storage problem, data received
by attacker device is transferred to a PC to be stored.
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RS232 communication is used to transfer data from FPGA board to PC. Serial port
data received by PC is further processed by MATLAB.
6.2.2 Software
Two different code designs were implemented for both Microblaze processor of FPGA
stage and MATLAB. MATLAB controls the serial port at PC stage. At first, the system
is programmed to record and save the communication between reader and tag.
According to the communication protocol, reader starts the communication with the
reader by sending a frame of 176 bits including 64 bits of random number. Upon
receiving the data, the tag encodes the random number and sends back 168bits
including 64bits of encoded data. Hence, the communication, protocol is a two way
authentication protocol.
Figure 6.2: Matlab code record case flow chart.
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Considering the protocol, the attacker should be capable of recording both the data
sent by reader and tag and save it for a definite number of communication periods. To
accomplish a replay attack by taking all probabilities into account, the communication
has to be saved 2n times where n represents the number of bits, which means saving all
possible random numbers in n bit order and so forming up a complete sample context.
Since n is 64 for the protocol used in this project, it means (176bits+168bits)264 times,
which corresponds to a huge size of data. It is not possible to record and handle so huge
size of a data due to memory limitation and some precautions against replay attacks.
Hence, communication record number was limited to 1000 times in this project.
Figure 6.3: Matlab code attack case flow chart.
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 MATLAB codes for recording and saving the communication.
Firstly, Microblaze waits for the interrupt from RFM22B which indicates 176 bit reader
data is received. Then, reader data is sent to MATLAB over serial communication.
MATLAB receives the data and saves it in a txt file called "DataFile.txt" and starts to
wait for the next 168 bit tag data. Simultaneously, Microblaze, waiting for the reader
data, sends it to the PC upon receiving and MATLAB saves the tag data to the same
line in txt file after reader data and goes to next line for incoming data.
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Table 6.1: Stored data.
Reader Data Tag Data
rR1 EK1(rR1)
rR2 EK2(rR2)
rR3 EK3(rR3)
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
rR1000 EK1000(rR1000)
In second part, Microblaze and MATLAB were programmed to realize replay attacks.
In this action, attacker waits for reader to send the data with the random number. When
the data is received by attacker, it is directly sent to MATLAB and compared with the
previously saved reader data. If the data matches with stored data, then MATLAB
sends the corresponding tag data to Microblaze. At last, Microblaze sends it to reader
and waits for authentication.
6.3 Replay Attacks and Results
Attacks were accomplished two times with different communication distances between
reader and attacker in indoor environment.
6.3.1 Short range attacks
In short range attack applications, the distance between reader and attacker device
was 3 meters with a clear line of sight (LOS). The devices were performing in office
environment. Since the distance between devices is very short, possible reflection
sources were underestimated.
Replay attacks were carried out 10 times. Each specific time, 176 bit rR data sent
by the reader is received by attacker device and compared with the previously saved
data in database. The comparisons did not match any time and in this case, attacker
device returned a random tag data, EKn(rRn), from the database to reader as reply.
Unfortunately returned tag data was denied at reader stage at all trials. Since the CRC
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check failed all time, reader did not further continue to process the received tag data
and resend reader data to the receivers around, which is only the attacker device in this
case.
6.3.2 Long Range Attacks
During the long range attack applications, attacker device was placed in a different
room where the LOS was absent. The placement configuration is seen below.
Figure 6.4: Long range attacks.
At frequency of operation, calculated free space path loss is 54.7dB. If the reader
outputs max power level signals, which is 20dBm, the power level of the signal at
attack device antenna would be −34.7dBm. Also, considering the losses caused by
the wall, which is approximately 5dB, power level becomes −40dBm. Under these
conditions, it is observed that the system can operate normally without any change in
the operation.
To find the minimum signal level attacker can operate, signal attenuators were
connected to attack device antenna in an increasing order. Starting from 10dB,
attenuation level was increased to 40dB by time. Attacker was still able to receive
reader signals without error, analyze and respond back till 40dB attenuation. But if the
attenuation level was increased more, errors were observed in data received by attack
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device. The reason of the errors in received data is the receive sensitivity level of the
attacker front-end. Since the level was reached, data was not received properly by the
device.
As seen in the Table 6.2, there is 40dB difference between receive sensitivity level of
transceiver module and received signal level. Possibly, the reason of the difference is
reflections caused by walls, metal stuff and etc. in the area of experiment. Moreover,
another option is the existence of a signal source operating in close frequency range.
Table 6.2: Link budget calculation.
Source Level
Output power 20dBm
FSPL −54.7dB
Attenuation on wall −5dB
Attenuation at receiver −40dB
Received signal power −80dBm
Receive sensitivity −120dBm
Received signal power −80dBm
Losses caused by other sources 40dB
Long range attack studies were completed in mentioned conditions, when the original
tag was out of communication. Process of the attack is the same as in short range
attacks. rR data sent by the reader is received and compared with stored data. If there
is a match, corresponding tag data is sent. Attack was handled 10 different times, but
the result was negative. No matching occurred between the reader data and stored data.
Therefore, authentication failed.
6.4 Possible Precautions
Some simple countermeasures exist in RFID as solutions to protocol or system security
against replay attacks.
6.4.1 Timestamps
Use of timestamps within transmitted data frame stands as the easiest solution. In
this technique, reader attaches time information to the transmitted data which relates
the time of transmission. Tag do not changes the time information but places the
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information in the response frame. Upon receiving the tag data, reader checks for the
time variant parameter and compares it with the receive time value. If ∆ t ≤ t ′ equality
holds, where t
′
represents the pre defined max possible communication duration, the
reader evaluates the received information. In other cases, the tag is not authenticated.
Timestamps might be implemented using any other techniques to provide more
security. Moreover, use of encrypted timestamps provides higher security in protocols
against several attacks as replay and counterfeiting, but the system must be capable of
meeting the computational power requirements in such a case.
6.4.2 RF Directivity
Another approach is the use of RF shielding on readers in order to limit the
directionality of radio signals. In a simple case, radio waves propagate to any direction
from the antenna with power levels in any direction proportional to directivity of the
transmitting antenna. In this cases, an adversary with very low receive sensitivity
might eavesdrop the communication from long distances. However, by applying
shielding techniques in reader and tag structures and increasing the propagation
directivity of transmitted waves, omnidirectional propagation might be prevented.
Thus, communication security can be increased against eavesdropping and replay
attacks.
6.4.3 Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI)
RSSI is basicly a technique used in RF systems and calculations to indicate the power
level of received signal. RSSI technique might be used to increase the security in RFID
systems against attacks. RSSI information could definitely be used in order to make a
discrimination between authorized and unauthorized readers or tags and subsequently
mitigate replay attacks. Otherwise, reader decides that However to apply the technique,
readers might be capable of indicating received signal strength, which increases the
design cost.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES
Security and privacy are main blockades in front of radio frequency application
systems being injected into daily life. RFID systems are widely being used in every
corner of life nowadays. While large retail companies use RFID systems to control live
stocks and supply chains, companies and even high schools started to use RFID tags to
control workers and students in work hours. In most cases, given tags carry important
personal information or critical reports about the products in the stock. Vulnerability
of the protocols used by mentioned systems against attacks, leads to a decrease in
trust to the technology. Having known the fact, scientists have completed thousands of
different research studies on increasing the security in RFID protocols. Large number
of new protocols were developed and great efforts were given on strengthening the
weak points of the protocols. Moreover, very important cryptographic algorithm were
also developed by designers to increase data security in RFID systems. However,
research and development on design of more secure RFID systems is required.
Under consideration of above mentioned facts, design and implementation of an
UHF RFID system was accomplished in first phase of the thesis, by proposing new
reader and transponder structures. Active tag architecture was preferred in system
design to keep the communication range long and security level high. As a result
of detailed investigation of RFID frequency bands and regulations, frequency of
operation was selected in UHF band. Low frequency systems are generally Near-Field
Communication systems and maximum allowed communication range in specified
ISM bands is very low. Therefore, 868 MHz center frequency is selected for system
operation considering European UHF band RFID regulations. RFM22B transceiver
modules were decided on and used for RF front-end stages of reader and tag taking
into low power consumption and flexible operating features.
Spartan3E Starter FPGA boards formed up microcontroller part of designed reader and
tag to keep the computational power substantially high. A communication protocol
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with two way authentication mechanism was used between receiver and transmitter
devices. In the protocol, reader sends 64 byte random number to the tag without
encryption. Received data is then encrypted by tag and sent back to the reader. Upon
receiving the tag data, reader does the decryption and compares it with sent data. If
the match is positive, tag is authenticated, else not. Tiny Encryption Algorithm was
preferred in the design to secure the transmitted data. As a result, a secure RFID system
with 64 byte authentication procedure is implemented.
In second part, attack studies were held on designed system. The aim of the attacks
were to impersonate the original tag with attack device and convince the reader that
original tag is in range of communication. To accomplish replay attacks, an attack
device similar to the reader and tag architecture, was designed and prepared for
operation. Firstly, reader and tag data was listened by attack device and sent to a
personal computer for storage over serial communication link. Later on, stored data
is replayed back to the reader when the original tag was out of communication range.
Reader data was received by attack device, sent to MATLAB for comparison with
stored data and if there was a match, corresponding 168 bit reader data was replayed
back. If the match fails, a random tag data was replayed back to the reader.
Attack studies were carried out two times with different distances between reader and
attacker. First case was short range attacks, where the distance between reader and
attacker was 3m in distance with clear line of sight. Attacker listened to reader 10
times and compared received data with the previously saved data, but the match was
negative. Random tag data was sent back to the reader had failed in authentication. It
was proven that proposed system is secure against short range replay attacks.
In second case, long range attacks were carried out, where the receive sensitivity
limit of the receiver was reached. Long range attacks were done in same procedure
as short range attacks. Every time authentication failed and the result of the attacks
was negative. It was proven that proposed system is secure against long range replay
attacks.
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All in all, a secure RFID system was designed, implemented and system security
against replay attacks from short and long ranges was proven. Designed system can be
used in long range identification systems with high security needs.
Completed study is a part of TUBITAK project named Design and Implementation
of A Secure RFID System. In future steps of the study, new attack scenarios will
be prepared against the system and trials will be completed. Hence system security
against different RFID attacks will be seen and possible precautions will be taken.
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